The Constitution of India, through Article 368, empowers Parliament to amend its provisions. This ensures adaptability to changing social, political, and economic needs. However, unlike ordinary laws, constitutional amendments require special procedures and face substantive restrictions under judicial interpretation.

Procedural Limitations on Amending Power

1. Special Majority Requirement: Most amendments require a special majority in both Houses of Parliament. This means approval by two-thirds of members present and voting, plus a majority of the total membership. This higher threshold, seen in the 104th Amendment (2019) extending SC/ST reservations, prevents frequent or casual changes.
2. State Ratification: Certain amendments that alter federal provisions—such as representation of states in Parliament, powers of the Union and states, or election of the President—require ratification by at least half of state legislatures. For example, the 101st Amendment (2016) introducing the Goods and Services Tax needed state ratification to maintain federal balance.
3. Presidential Assent: Every amendment must receive Presidential assent. Unlike ordinary bills, the President cannot withhold or return a constitutional amendment, ensuring finality once both Houses and states (if required) approve it.
4. No Joint Sitting Provision: In case of disagreement between the two Houses, there is no joint sitting provision. This forces consensus-building within each House separately before an amendment can be passed.

Substantive Limitations on Amending Power

1. Basic Structure Doctrine: In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court held that while Parliament’s power under Article 368 is broad, it cannot destroy the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Core elements include:

   • Supremacy of the Constitution
   • Republican and democratic form of government
   • Secularism and federalism
   • Judicial review and separation of powers

2. Judicial Review of Amendments: In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), an amendment restricting judicial review of elections was invalidated. Similarly, in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the Court struck down provisions that sought to give Parliament unlimited amending power, reinforcing the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

3. Post-1973 Amendments Scrutiny: In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), the Court clarified that even laws placed under the Ninth Schedule after 1973 are subject to basic structure review, preventing misuse of the amendment power to shield unconstitutional laws.

4. Implied Limitations: Attempts like the 42nd Amendment (1976), which tried to make Parliament’s amending power unlimited, were curtailed by the judiciary. This reflects that amendments cannot be used to undermine the very framework of constitutional democracy.

The amending power under Article 368 is a careful compromise. Procedural safeguards like special majorities and state ratification ensure broad consensus, while substantive limits like the basic structure doctrine protect core values. This balance has given the Constitution both rigidity and flexibility, keeping it stable yet adaptable to new challenges while preserving its founding ideals.