Model Answer

The G7 was formed in 1975 as the steering group of industrialised democracies coordinating global economic policy. Its claim to that role is now genuinely contested.

Institution in Churn: The Evidence The G7's share of global GDP has shrunk as China and India have grown, weakening its claim to set the world's economic direction alone. Parallel platforms, the G20, BRICS, and the SCO, now offer emerging economies alternative venues, ending the G7's monopoly on agenda-setting. Internal fractures have widened: differing positions on Russia sanctions, the Trump administration's tariff unilateralism, and divergent China policies have strained the unity the bloc was built on. The G7 has no secretariat or binding authority, so its outputs, such as the 2026 Evian communique on Ukraine, Iran, and economic imbalances, remain statements of intent, not enforceable commitments. Regular outreach invitations to India, Brazil, Kenya, and South Korea signal that the G7 itself recognises it cannot address global challenges, such as critical mineral supply chains or AI governance, without emerging-economy participation.

Struggling for Relevance: The Counter-Evidence The bloc still commands roughly half of global GDP, giving it real weight in coordinating sanctions and financial-stability responses, evident in its swift, unified messaging on the West Asia ceasefire process in 2026. It retains first-mover convening power on emerging governance issues, AI regulation and de-risking critical mineral supply chains from China were core agenda items at Evian precisely because like-minded economies can align faster than at the larger G20. Its informality is a strength, not just a weakness: the freedom to vary its outreach list each year, India, Brazil, Kenya, Egypt, and South Korea in 2026, lets it stay responsive rather than locked into rigid structures.

Though there is a Transition happening, but G7 is not obsolescence The accurate framing is recalibration, not decline: the G7 is shifting from sole steering committee to convening anchor in a multipolar order, shaping agendas through coalitions rather than dictating outcomes unilaterally. Its expanding outreach diplomacy reflects adaptive acknowledgment of multipolarity, not terminal irrelevance, since it still sets the table even when it can no longer write the final bill alone.

Though the G7 is not the unchallenged steering committee of 1975, but it is also not irrelevant. It is recalibrating, leaning on economic weight and outreach diplomacy to remain a convening power amid a churn it cannot fully control.